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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ZONING: APPEAL "DE NOVO"
FROM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
A troublesome problem has arisen in connection with zon-
ing statutes which vest in the courts power to hear de novo
appeals from zoning and planning commissions.' It has been
held that such a statute is invalid as an attempt to vest a leg-
islative duty in the courts.' To avoid the same conclusion,
other courts limit the review to typically judicial questions;
they review the agency's conclusions of law and determine
if factual conclusions are supported by substantial evi-
dence.' But there are courts which hold that power to
review, de novo, administrative decisions, whatever their
character, is quite proper.4 With these three views, we stand
in a shadow of confusion. The question is: which course
would be proper for Oklahoma courts in light of the state's
constitution and zoning statutes?
In 1964 the Kentucky Court of Appeals was concerned
with this exact problem in American Beauty Homes Corp.
v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm'n. 1 There the court was faced with the validity of a
Kentucky statute which provided that an aggrieved party
... may appeal from such action or decision (of the
zoning and planning commission) to the circuit court of
such county, and jurisdiction is hereby given to such
circuit court to hear and determine all questions and is-
sues properly brought before it on such appeal ....
[Hlearing in the circuit court shall be de novo .... _
The Court of Appeals held that to the extent that it re-
quired a "de novo" trial in the circuit court on appeal, the
I1 Cooper, STATE ADmnmTRATIV LAw, 27-29 (1965).
2 E.g., Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 132 So.2d 120 (1961).
8 Cooper, op. cit. supra note 1, at n. 37.4 E.g., Ex Parte Darnell, 262 Ala. 71, 76 So.2d 770 (1955).
i379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).6 Ky. REv. STAT. tit. IX; ch. 100, § 100.057 (1962).
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statute undertook to impose upon the court a nonjudicial
administrative function and thereby violated constitutional
provisions for the separation of powers. Looking directly
at the legislative delegation involved in this statute, the
court said:
if a court is required to try out independently the
propriety of an adjustment in a zoning plan, then the
court is simply substituted for the Commission in de-
termining and applying legislative policy to local con-
ditions which require the expertise of an adminis-
trative agency. The legislature cannot, by directing a
method of appeal procedure, impose upon the courts
administrative duties to carry out its policies by dis-
cretionary decisions .... 8
Reasoning further that this statute required the court to
adjudicate upon administrative rather than judicial consid-
erations, the court held that this type appeal is really no
different than the making of an initial discretionary de-
cision, which in the case of zoning, belongs solely to the
legislature. Bal v. Jones9 is cited by the court in this case.
There the Alabama court held that a statute0 providing for
an appeal from a municipal zoning decision to a circuit court,
with a right to trial de novo, attempted to impose upon the
circuit court a nonjudicial function concerning a matter ex-
clusively within the power and discretion of the legislative
body of the city, and that such statute was violative of sec-
tions of the state constitution" providing for the separation
of powers of the government into three branches. However,
7 "The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them to be confined to a separate body of magistracy,
to wit: those which are legislative, to one; those which are
executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another."
Ky. CONST. § 27 (1891).
8 American Beauty Homes Corporation v. Louisville and Jef-
ferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, supra note 5,
at 455.
9 Supra note 2.
10 GEN. ACTS. ALA. No. 729, § 6 (1957).
1 ALA. CONST., §§ 42, 43 (1901).
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in Ball the court decided that the "de novo" feature ex-
tinguished any right to appeal. This was not the outcome of
American Beauty, where the Kentucky court preferred the
ruling in California Co. v. State Oil and Gas Bd.'2 In Cali-
fornia, the court held invalid a provision of a statute that an
appeal to the circuit court from an oil well spacing order of
the State Oil and Gas Board shall be tried de novo. The re-
mainder of the statute was upheld so as to authorize an
appeal for the limited purpose of determining whether the
board's decision was supported by substantial evidence, or
whether it was arbitrary or capricious, beyond the power
of the board to make, or violative of the constitutional right
of the complaining party. It should be noted that Kentucky
has held that the function of a county planning and
zoning commission is, in part, quasi-judicial. 3 This would
give the court a basis for upholding the "de novo" statute,
but instead, the decision was based on constitutional and
administrative law principles which will not allow such a
delegation of a legislative function.
There have been several recent cases dealing with the
"de novo-zoning" problem which have been based either
upon somewhat different statutes than those discussed
above or no statute at all. Where there was no statute pre-
scribing the appeal from a planning and zoning board, the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that decisions
of zoning authorities were to be overruled only when it is
found that they had not acted fairly, with proper motives and
upon valid reasons.'4 A similar result was reached in Mis-
souri in Brown v. Beuc,5 where it was held that the review-
ing court was not vested with power to supervise discretion
lodged with the board and was not authorized to hear de
novo and to then make such order as in its opinion the board
12 200 Miss. 824, 27 So.2d 542 (1946).
13 E.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm'n v. Ogden, 307 Ky. 362, 210 S.W.2d 771 (1948).
'
4Verney v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town
of Greenwich, 151 Conn. 578, 200 A.2d 714 (1964).
'r 384 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. 1964).
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should have made. Working with an entirely different situa-
tion, the Appellate Court of Indiana, in Metropolitan Bd. of
Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Froe Corp.,"0 held that
the trial court erred in trying de novo and substituting its
discretion for that of the board. However, in this case the
statute provided specifically that the trial was not to be
de novo when appealing from a board decision.17 On the
other hand, Georgia has upheld a de novo statute in Evans
v. Augusta-Richmond County Bd. of Zoning Appeals." It
should be pointed out, however, that this case centered
around the particular facts involved and was not based upon
the constitutional question of delegation. While these cases
do not indicate that a statute which grants a de novo hear-
ing on appeal from a zoning board is unconstitutional under
the separation of powers theory, they do seem to point up
the recognition, by both legislative and judicial elements, of
the legislative and discretionary role of the boards and also
the general limitations upon the scope of review by the
courts.
There have been some recent cases which, while not deal-
ing directly with zoning, do involve the scope of judicial re-
view of state administrative agency orders where a statute
has granted de novo hearings. In Loftin v. George County Bd.
of Educ.,0 the Mississippi court held that a statute,2 0 pro-
viding for trial de novo before a jury on an appeal from an
order of a county board of education to the circuit court,
was unconstitutional. The invalidity was based upon the sepa-
ration of power provisions of the state constitution,21 pro-
viding for the normal three distinct departments and con-
fining each to its separate magistry. Likewise, a Texas stat-
ute2 provided that a proceeding on appeal to the district
18 209 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. 1965).
1 BuRxs' AmN. STAT. or IwD., § 53-979. (1964).
18 113 Ga. App. 113, 147 S.E.2d 455 (1966).
19 183 So.2d 621 (Miss. 1966).20 MIss. CODE, § 6334-05 (1942).21 TSS. CoNST. art. I, §§ 1, 2 (1890).
2 2 VE oN's TEX. ANN. Civ. STAT. art 4506 (1948).
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court by a physician from a decision of the State Board of
Medical Examiners revoking licenses "shall be de novo."
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Scott"3 held that statute unconstitu-
tional because it breached the traditional division of powers
between the three departments of state government. Zoning
is not the substantive problem involved in these cases. In-
stead, the courts are dealing with the right to practice medi-
cine in the Texas case and orders from the county board of
education in the Loftin case. But, in both cases, the court
decided that de novo hearings were improper because the
functions performed by the two boards were of the type
which were to be performed solely by the administrative
agency involved. Separation of powers keeps the courts from
entering into these fields and substituting their determina-
tion for that of the board. Therefore, these cases do have a
bearing upon our zoning statutes granting de novo appeals
as far as the constitutional and administrative law issues go.
Oklahoma's legislature, like that of Kentucky, has estab-
lished a right to appeal from a decision by the Board of Ad-
justment, which is established to hear cases and make ex-
ceptions to zoning ordinances.24 It has provided further
that "... said case shall be heard and tried de novo in the
District Court."2 Distribution of powers, provided for in the
Oklahoma Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 1, provides a separa-
tion of powers almost identical with that of Kentucky. It
reads as follows:
The powers of the government of the State of
Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate depart-
ments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and
except as provided in this Constitution, the Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judicial departments of govern-
ment shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall
exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the
others.
2 377 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App., 1964).
24 OKL-A. STAT. tit. 11, § 407 (1961).
25 OK&A. STAT. tit. 11, § 408 (1961).
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It would therefore seem advantageous to look at the Okla-
homa statute in the light of American Beauty. Doing this
would result in a determination that the de novo provision
is in conflict with the above constitutional provision. But,
in order to establish invalidity of an Oklahoma statute there
should be Oklahoma authority to support the thesis of Amer-
icna Beauty. Of course, the general proposition exists that
zoning regulations are legislative rather than judicial in
character. 8 Oklahoma has established an accord with this
theory in Keaton v. Oklahoma City." In Keaton, the court
said:
* . . the State Legislature authorized municipalities to
enact zoning ordinances, and when the legislative branch
of the municipal government has acted in a particular
case, its expressed judgment on the subject will not
be overridden by the judiciary, unless the same is un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or constitutes an unequal exercise
of police power.28
There the court relied upon Beveridge v. Harper & Turner
Oil Trust.29 Beveridge involved an attempt by property own-
ers to have a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of their
property for the production of oil and gas declared uncon-
stitutional as being an unreasonable restriction upon the use
of their property. The court took this opportunity to thor-
oughly discuss the nature and role of the zoning authority,
the board of adjustment, and the reviewing court, stating:
... we cannot... hold that the board of adjustment is in
effect a superior legislative body authorized to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body of the city
... Nor can the district court, a judicial body, exercise
such a power on appeal.30
Therefore, in Oklahoma it is recognized that the concept
of zoning is legislative and that the role of the judiciary in re-
26 E.g., 101 C.J.S. Zoning, § 1, at n. 26 (1958).
27 187 Okla. 593, 102 P.2d 938 (1940), Cert. denied 311 U.S. 616
(1940).28Keaton v. Oklahoma City, supra note 27, at 938.
29 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d 435 (1934).30Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, supra note 29, at 442.
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viewing determinations by the board of adjustment is limited
to determining whether or not they were arbitrary and un-
reasonable.
In holding a trial de novo on appeal from the board of
adjustment the question is, what function is the court per-
forming? It is examining the facts of a zoning problem and
deciding supposed judicial questions. The result is an exer-
cise by the court of its discretion in controlling the applica-
tion of the zoning ordinances to individual property owners.
Yet the Oklahoma court has still allowed the use of the de
novo appeal and the substitution of its orders for those of the
board of adjustment.3'
Re-examining the question in the opening paragraph, there
seems but one answer: The separation of governmental
functions. The legislative function of providing zoning or-
dinances should be carried out by the municipal corporation
with the board of adjustment to provide hearings for those
who desire to become exceptions. Appeals to the district
court should deal solely with the judicial questions ap-
plicable to a reviewing court. A trial de novo is not only a
delegation of legislative authority to the courts; it is also a
waste of both expertise in the field of zoning and time of
the courts in adjudicating something more properly deter-
mined by the board.
John Turner
31 Appeal of Fred Jones Co., 203 Okla. 321, 220 P.2d 245 (1950).
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